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INTRODUCTION
This paper describes stylised facts about wage flexibility in
Hungary, based on a survey of wage setting among
Hungarian firms. The survey is part of the Eurosystem Wage
Dynamics Network (WDN): it is a harmonised questionnaire
administered in 17 countries
1 in Europe. Here we focus
mainly on the Hungarian results, and only on a single issue,
the flexibility of wages. We do, however, use the European
findings to place Hungarian wage setting in a broader
context.
The survey was implemented in a decentralised way in which
each National Central Bank was responsible for carrying out
the survey within its own country. The Hungarian data were
collected through personal interviews. The person
interviewed was preferably the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) or the Human Resource Manager of the firm. The
reference year in the questionnaire was 2006, unless
otherwise specified. The sample was restricted to firms
having more than five employees. It included seven sectors:
manufacturing; electricity, gas, water; construction; trade;
business services; financial intermediation; non-business
services. The Hungarian sample was representative of
employment, so the sampling probability was proportional to
firm size. International comparison of the results is made
possible by appropriate weights provided by the WDN. Due
to poor international comparability, the energy sector and
non-market services are excluded from this analysis.
The questions asked can be divided into the following broad
categories: (i) descriptive questions about the firm and its
employees, (ii) wage setting and wage changes, (iii) wage
rigidity and shocks, (iv) price setting and wages. Here we
only focus on (ii) and (iii), which relate directly to wage
flexibility. For a general overview of the European results,
see Babeczky et al. (2009a), Babeczky et al. (2009b), Bertola
et al. (2009), and Druant et al. (2009). Kézdi and Kónya




Many countries in Europe apply collective agreement in the
wage bargaining process. This can take place at the country,
sector, or firm level. 
As Chart 1 shows, collective wage agreements are common in
the euro area countries, but they are rare in the new member
states. The difference is large: the Hungarian coverage is
below 20%, while in the euro area countries it is above 80%.
We document results from a survey of wage setting in Hungarian enterprises. The survey was developed and coordinated by the
Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network, and it was administered in 17 European countries; this allows us to put the Hungarian
findings in context. The main conclusion from the survey is that while Hungarian firms operate in a quite flexible institutional
environment, their wage setting practices are relatively rigid. In its wage setting outcomes, Hungary shares more similarities
with Western European countries than with countries in the Central and Eastern European region. The survey provides strong
evidence that the observed wage setting behaviour can be explained by internal factors related to employee motivation,
perceived fairness, and firms’ desire to maintain a desired wage distribution.
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1 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia
and Spain.Equally striking is the fact that while in the old member states
collective agreements occur mostly at the country or sector
level, in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region
2
only firm-level agreements are present. We thus conclude
that in Hungary the wage setting process takes place mostly
at the individual level, similarly to other countries in the
region but in stark contrast to the euro area nations.
The structure of wages
Performance related components of the overall wage bill are
usually more flexible than the wage bill. The WDN data
show that in Hungary they are moderately important,
comprising about 10% of the overall wage bill. Interestingly,
in this respect, Hungary is more similar to the euro area with
an average of 9% than to the CEE countries, where such
wage components are more common, with a share of more
than 16% of the wage bill.
Inflation indexation is another important determinant of wage
flexibility. Chart 2 shows that a significant minority of
Hungarian employees work in firms with some kind of
indexation. Out of these cases, the majority use implicit
adjustment to inflation. Inflation indexation is less prevalent
in Hungary than in other CEE countries, which may be
surprising given the country’s history of fairly high and
volatile inflation. One explanation could be that by 2006
inflation was low enough to allow firms to move away from
(implicit) indexation. The lack of centralised wage setting also
implies that there are no external indexation requirements on
firms. Finally, the results should be taken as a lower limit. It is
possible that while firms do not have an explicit (formal or
informal) policy of indexation, they nevertheless take inflation
into account when adjusting wages.
The timing of wage changes
An obvious indicator of wage flexibility is the timing and
frequency of wage changes. The survey question refers to
base wages, since other components are typically more
flexible. Chart 3 presents results concerning the frequency of
wage changes.
In most of the countries the majority of wages stay fixed for
one year, and the same is true in Hungary, where 80% of
firms adjust their wages once a year. This proportion is even
higher than in the euro area or the CEE region. In general,
new member states do not appear to have more frequent base
wage adjustments, even though they have more decentralised
wage setting institutions.
Since base wages are generally stable for an extended period,
it is important to know if wage changes simply happen in
predefined time periods (i.e. they are time-dependent), or
respond to changes in the environment only periodically (i.e.
they are state-dependent). Chart 4 shows that in Hungary,
time-dependent wage setting predominates. Fully 40% of
employees work in firms where wages are reset in January,
and the wages of another 30% are reset in the same month of
the year (other than January). These months are the ones
following January, so they still correspond closely to the end
of the calendar year. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even
among these firms wage changes are backdated to January, but
the survey does not directly ask about this kind of behaviour.
There is large heterogeneity in Europe in this respect. While
new member states have much lower rates of time-
dependence, euro area countries have significantly higher
rates of time-dependent wage setting (although still not as
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2The Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and Hungary.high as in Hungary). January seems to be a focal point for
wage setting, but much less so in the CEE region.
From the frequencies presented in Chart 3, it is possible to
calculate average wage durations that are useful for the
parameterisation of macro models with Calvo-type wage and
price rigidities. Details about the construction of average
durations can be found in Appendix 3 to Druant et al.
(2009). Average wage duration in Hungary is 13.8 months
(15 for the euro area and 14.8 for CEE), and average price
duration is 10.7 months (9.6 for the euro area and 9.5 for
CEE). These numbers are similar to other estimates, and the
cross-country differences are not substantial. We have also
calculated durations by sector and firm size, which are
available from the authors upon request. In a nutshell, we
found that in Hungary, sectoral and size heterogeneity is
moderate, especially for the duration of wages, very similarly
to other countries (see Druant et al., 2009).
Downward nominal wage rigidity
There is a large body of evidence that firms are reluctant to
cut wages (base wages in particular). Chart 5 confirms this for
Hungary and for Europe in general. In Hungary, less than
5% of employees experienced wage freezes; and essentially
none experienced wage cuts. Wage cuts are rare in all of the
countries, but freezes do happen: in the Czech Republic,
about 10% of employees were subject to pay freeze. The
difference between Hungary and the Czech Republic may be
explained by the different inflation environments. While
Hungary still had sizable inflation and fast average nominal
wage growth in the five years up to 2006, inflation was very
low in the Czech Republic in this period. Higher inflation
allows firms to cut real wages by keeping nominal wages
fixed (or increasing them less than the rate of inflation), while
in a low inflation environment significant real wage cuts must
also involve nominal wage decreases. 
Chart 6 lists reasons why firms find it difficult to cut wages.
Many factors seem to be important, with the ones related to
motivation and morale being the most prevalent. Collective
agreements are much less important in Hungary and the
CEE region than in euro area countries, worries about
hiring difficulties and worker quits are less important in
Hungary, and implicit wage insurance (the intolerance of
instability) is somewhat more common in Hungary than in
other nations.
Wages of new hires
Another margin of adjustment of the overall wage bill is the
wages of newly hired employees. This becomes especially
important when the wages of existing employees are
infrequently adjusted, as we showed earlier. There is also a
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EA CEE HUgrowing body of theoretical and empirical evidence which
underscores the importance of this issue.
Chart 7 shows the most important factors in setting the wages
of newly hired workers. In euro area countries with sectoral
or nationwide wage setting these also apply to new hires.
Perhaps more interestingly, however, firms in the CEE
countries without such external constraints feel restricted by
internal wage equity considerations. In Hungary, almost 80%
of firms report that the wages inside the firm are very
relevant when they determine the wages of new entrants. The
same is true for CEE countries, but to a somewhat lesser
extent than for Hungarian firms.
Adjustment to external shocks
The survey also included questions that addressed (i) the
flexibility of wages in response to different types of shocks
and (ii) the importance of alternative adjustment
mechanisms. The hypothetical shocks under consideration
were: a decline in demand, a rise in the price of an
intermediate input, and an increase in competitors’ wages.
Here we focus only on the first; Kézdi and Kónya (2009) has
more details on the other shocks.
Chart 8 lists the most common ways firms respond when
demand for their products falls. Hungarian firms mostly try to
cut costs, while output, price and profit margin adjustments
are common in other countries. Base wages are never cut in
any of the countries, and cutting flexible wage components is
not very important either. Interestingly, adjusting temporary
employment is an important margin in the euro area, but not
in the new member states - presumably because such work
arrangements are less common in the CEE region.
The minimum wage
A section of the survey specific to Hungary asked about the
effects of an increase in the minimum wage. The questions
refer to (i) a hypothetical 20% increase in the minimum wage
and (ii) the actual increase in the minimum wage in 2001–
2002 (with a total increase of almost 100%). Table 1 lists the
answers to the first sets of questions. The findings are
consistent across the hypothetical and the actual experiments,
which differ only in their magnitudes (more details below).
For this reason, we report only results concerning the
hypothetical minimum wage increase.
On average, around 14% of employees would earn at or
below the hypothetical higher minimum wage (after the 20%
increase). Thus, such an increase would represent a
significant wage shock to firms. Given the magnitude of the
shock, it is surprising to find that very few companies would
respond by laying off workers: less than 8% indicated any
possible layoffs. Those who said yes would, on average, lay
off one-third of the affected workers. This implies that about
2.5% of affected employees and 0.34% of all employees
would lose their jobs as a direct result of the 20% increase in
the national minimum wage.
This number may seem surprisingly low: as a share of total
employment it is essentially zero. While one may suspect that
firms underestimate the layoffs in a hypothetical scenario, the
responses to the 2001-2002 minimum wage increase are even
lower. Note that such a weak response is corroborated by
other estimates: Kertesi and Köllõ (2003) estimated the
aggregate employment response to the 2001 increase (which
was nearly 60 per cent in itself) to be around 0.5%. The
weaker response to the 2001–2002 minimum wage increases
may be explained by the fact that they took place at a
different stage of the business cycle, and they may have hit
firms less than a similar or even weaker increase would in
2006. Of course, it is also possible that the minimum wage
was not effective before 2001–2002. Tonin (2007) provides
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EA CEE HUsome evidence that tax evasion was an important reason why
the reported minimum wage may not have been an effective
constraint on firms in that period.
The second important finding is that firms would (and did)
pass the minimum wage increase on to employees not directly
affected. About 30% of the firms (weighted by their
employment) gave an affirmative answer to this question, and
they would raise wages for a large set of their employees. In
case of a hypothetical 20% increase in the minimum wage,
these firms would increase the wages of an additional 62% by
around 10%. This implies that, in addition to the direct
effect, the minimum wage increase would lead to a further
2% increase in the economy-wide wage rate. Again, the
numbers are somewhat smaller for the 2001-2002 increase,
but they are still significant.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that firms are
concerned about the relationship among their employees and
want to have a wage distribution that is perceived as ‘fair’.
This seems to include the keeping of a ‘pecking order’ of
workers, where relative wages are important, in addition to
absolute levels. An interesting question is the way firms
would respond to maintain profitability in the face of a
significant cost shock. While the survey did not ask this
question for the minimum wage increase, previously we saw
that the way Hungarian companies are trying to adjust is
mainly by cutting non-labour costs.
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS
After presenting the findings from the WDN wage setting
survey, in this section we discuss their possible economic
interpretation.
The first conclusion we can draw from the survey is that
Hungarian firms are not constrained by external factors in
their wage setting factors (with the important exception of
the minimum wage). Collective agreements at the national or
sector level are non-existent, and even within firms wages are
typically set individually. On the other hand, wages are set in
a fairly rigid manner. The wages of new hires conform to the
wages of existing employees, and most firms reset their wages
at most once a year. Base wages are never cut, and are rarely
frozen, although the latter finding may be due to the sample
period during which average wage growth was high.
To reconcile these findings, we need to look for wage
theories that emphasise that wages may have other roles than
reflecting workers’ marginal product. Implicit contract
theory (see, for example, Beaudry and DiNardo 1991) argues
that workers receive an insurance against idiosyncratic
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By asking the following questions, we would mean min max  obs
like to learn about the consequences to your (weighted by wl)
firm of a hypothetical 20 per cent increase
of the minimum wage from its current level
(that is to HUF 79,000).
What fraction of your employees have earnings under
the hypothetical new minimum wage (that is, under 
HUF 79,000)? 13.7 0  100  1,517 
Due to the increase in the minimum wage, would
you lay off some employees whose wages would be 
directly affected (i.e. whose earnings are under
the hypothetical new minimum wage, that is, under
HUF 79,000)? Where: 1=yes (or likely), 
0=no (or not likely) 0.077  0  1  1,477 
If 1 (yes or likely), what fraction are those who are
affected (i.e. earn under HUF 79,000)?  31.8 1  100  85 
Due to the increase in the minimum wage, would you
increase wages of some employees whose wages
would not be directly affected (i.e. whose earnings
are above the hypothetical new minimum wage, 
that is, under HUF 79,000)? Where: 1=yes (or likely),
0=no (or not likely) 0.295  0  1  1,585 
If 1 (yes or likely), what fraction are those (i.e. earn
above HUF 79,000) 62.1 0  100  347 
If 1 (yes or likely), by how much on average? 9.9  0  38  225
Table 1
The effects of a hypothetical minimum wage increaseshocks, since firms may be better able to hedge against such
risks. While infrequent wage setting and the reluctance to cut
wages supports this hypothesis, the lack of inflation
indexation suggests either money illusion on the workers’
part or other considerations behind the stability of wages.
Another set of theories comes under the heading of
‘efficiency wages’. Efficiency wage theories assume that
wages may have an incentive component, so that the right
wage motivates workers to work harder and more
productively. Firms may use their wage setting policies to
alleviate moral hazard problems (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984),
to provide workers with a ‘fair’ wage relative to others
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1991), or to reduce costly turnover
(Salop, 1979). An important empirical contribution in this
area is Bewley (1999). In interviews with over 300 business
leaders and human resource officers, Bewley found that
employers are reluctant to cut wages because they think it
would hurt morale.
The WDN survey is supportive of the Bewley (1999)
findings. Firms are reluctant to cut wages even in the case of
adverse shocks. This is true even for flexible wage
components which should in principle act as ‘shock
absorbents’. It seems that bonuses are used less to
accommodate outside shocks, and more to motivate
individual worker effort. Employers also pay close attention
to relative wages within the company, either in the case of
new hires or in the case of changes in the minimum wage.
Altogether, a robust conclusion seems to be that maintaining
employee morale and work incentives is a key consideration
in wage setting.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we summarised findings from the 2006
Hungarian wage setting survey of the Eurosystem Wage
Dynamics Network. We focused on the aggregate findings
and comparisons to two country groups, the euro area and
the CEE region. The main results can be listed as follows:
• Hungarian firms dot not face external constraints in wage
setting, with the important exception of the minimum
wage.
•  Despite this fact, wages appear rigid, particularly base
wages. They are reset on average at most once a year, in a
time-dependent fashion.
•  Wages are irresponsive to temporary shocks. Firms are
accommodating these shocks by cutting other costs, and to
a lesser degree, by changing prices, margins and output.
• Flexible wage components are not used to absorb external
shocks; rather they seem to be used for internal
motivation.
• The WDN survey provides support for the time-dependent
nature of wage setting. Wages are reset infrequently,
mostly once a year. Many wages are adjusted in January, or
in other fixed periods.
• By 2006 the minimum wage is a binding constraint for
firms. A 20% minimum wage increase would spill over to
other workers, and lead to an additional 2% increase in
average wages.
• Overall, the Hungarian labour market is similar to other
CEE countries and is institutionally flexible. In terms of
outcomes, however, it is much more similar to the more
rigid euro area countries.
Many other interesting questions can be investigated that we
did not have the space to do in this overview - a task that we
leave for future research. A particularly interesting question
concerns the behaviour of firms under different
circumstances. The current labour market conditions are very
different from the ones in 2006 and repeating or updating
the survey would provide information on how firms adapt to
such changed circumstances. We hope that such an update
will indeed take place, and we look forward to reporting the
findings from that exercise.
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